Autonomy in Determinism :: Determinism Papers

Autonomy in Determinism (1) ABSTRACT: There are good reasons for determinism — the option for pure freedom of will proves to be a non-tenable position. However, this collides with the everyday experience of autonomy. The following argument will attempt to show that determinism and autonomy are compatible. (1) A first consideration going back to MacKay makes clear that I myself cannot foresee in principle my own determination; hence fatalism has lost its grounds. (2) From the perspective of physical determination, I show that quantum-physical indetermination is not at all in a position to explain autonomy, while from the perspective of systems theory physical determination and autonomy is well-compatible. (3) The possibility of knowledge denotes a further increase of such autonomy. From this perspective, acting is something like designing-oneself or choice-of-oneself. (4) Consciousness of not being fixed in principle now becomes a determining condition of my acting, which appears to be determined by auton omy. This explains the ineradicable conviction that freedom of will is essential for human beings. (5) I conclude that the autonomy of acting is greater the more that rational self-determination takes the place of stupid arbitrariness. In 1980 a book by U. Pothast came out with the provocative title 'The Inadequacy of the Proofs for Freedom'. (2) Its merit consisted in the fact that it runs through and refutes all the known types of proofs for freedom in the philosophical tradition. Pothast's arguments, which thereby amount to determinism, are in my opinion basically sound, but surely also need a discriminating judgement, which is treated in the following discussion. The view mentioned is alarming in two respects: First of all, in accordance with the way we see ourselves we are convinced that freedom is essential for man's being. Secondly, philosophers think they have excellent arguments against determinism. The strongest objection to determinism is in my view the following: (3) Truth, i.e., accurate knowledge of the facts of a case is only possible for me when I can cognitively get involved with the subject. However, the precondition for this is that I am not determined by irrelevant constraints in connection with the subject — e.g., by physical factors or by my own biological-genetic constitution, but also not by prejudices and preconcieved notions: precisely because I could not involve myself in the subject because of such constraints. Reduced to a formula, this means: truth presupposes freedom. As a philosophical theory, determinism itself lays claim to truth, which therewith presupposes freedom, in accordance with what I have just said. Autonomy in Determinism :: Determinism Papers Autonomy in Determinism (1) ABSTRACT: There are good reasons for determinism — the option for pure freedom of will proves to be a non-tenable position. However, this collides with the everyday experience of autonomy. The following argument will attempt to show that determinism and autonomy are compatible. (1) A first consideration going back to MacKay makes clear that I myself cannot foresee in principle my own determination; hence fatalism has lost its grounds. (2) From the perspective of physical determination, I show that quantum-physical indetermination is not at all in a position to explain autonomy, while from the perspective of systems theory physical determination and autonomy is well-compatible. (3) The possibility of knowledge denotes a further increase of such autonomy. From this perspective, acting is something like designing-oneself or choice-of-oneself. (4) Consciousness of not being fixed in principle now becomes a determining condition of my acting, which appears to be determined by auton omy. This explains the ineradicable conviction that freedom of will is essential for human beings. (5) I conclude that the autonomy of acting is greater the more that rational self-determination takes the place of stupid arbitrariness. In 1980 a book by U. Pothast came out with the provocative title 'The Inadequacy of the Proofs for Freedom'. (2) Its merit consisted in the fact that it runs through and refutes all the known types of proofs for freedom in the philosophical tradition. Pothast's arguments, which thereby amount to determinism, are in my opinion basically sound, but surely also need a discriminating judgement, which is treated in the following discussion. The view mentioned is alarming in two respects: First of all, in accordance with the way we see ourselves we are convinced that freedom is essential for man's being. Secondly, philosophers think they have excellent arguments against determinism. The strongest objection to determinism is in my view the following: (3) Truth, i.e., accurate knowledge of the facts of a case is only possible for me when I can cognitively get involved with the subject. However, the precondition for this is that I am not determined by irrelevant constraints in connection with the subject — e.g., by physical factors or by my own biological-genetic constitution, but also not by prejudices and preconcieved notions: precisely because I could not involve myself in the subject because of such constraints. Reduced to a formula, this means: truth presupposes freedom. As a philosophical theory, determinism itself lays claim to truth, which therewith presupposes freedom, in accordance with what I have just said.